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Viruses with pandemic potential including H1N1, H5N1, and H5N7 influenza viruses, and
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)/Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)
coronaviruses (CoV) have emerged in recent years. SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and influenza
virus can survive on surfaces for extended periods, sometimes up to months. Factors
influencing the survival of these viruses on surfaces include: strain variation, titre,
surface type, suspending medium, mode of deposition, temperature and relative hu-
midity, and the method used to determine the viability of the virus. Environmental
sampling has identified contamination in field-settings with SARS-CoV and influenza
virus, although the frequent use of molecular detection methods may not necessarily
represent the presence of viable virus. The importance of indirect contact transmission
(involving contamination of inanimate surfaces) is uncertain compared with other
transmission routes, principally direct contact transmission (independent of surface
contamination), droplet, and airborne routes. However, influenza virus and SARS-CoV
may be shed into the environment and be transferred from environmental surfaces
to hands of patients and healthcare providers. Emerging data suggest that MERS-CoV
also shares these properties. Once contaminated from the environment, hands can
then initiate self-inoculation of mucous membranes of the nose, eyes or mouth.
Mathematical and animal models, and intervention studies suggest that contact
transmission is the most important route in some scenarios. Infection prevention and
control implications include the need for hand hygiene and personal protectivefection Prevention Society Conference, Glasgow, September 29th to October 1st, 2014.
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Figure 1. Transmission routes: droplet, air
of hand and surface.) Definitions of ‘droplequipment to minimize self-contamination and to protect against inoculation of 
mucosal surfaces and the respiratory tract, and enhanced surface cleaning and disin-
fection in healthcare settings.Introduction
A number of viruses with pandemic potential have emerged
in recent years. The 2002 emergence of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), 2009 pandemic of H1N1
influenza, continued circulation of influenza H5N1 and H5N7
strains, and the recent emergence of the Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) illustrate the current
threat of these viruses.1e4
Despite fundamental differences in their structure and
epidemiology, these pandemic viral threats share a number of
important properties. They are zoonotic enveloped RNA res-
piratory viruses that rarely transmit between humans in their
native form, but could mutate to allow more efficient human-
to-human transmission. This was illustrated by the 2002e2003
SARS pandemic and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic.3,4
Frequent and accepted transmission routes are ‘droplet
transmission’, where droplets (>5 mm diameter, travelling
<1m) containing viable viruses make contact with the nose,
mouth, eyes, or upper respiratory tract, and ‘airborne trans-
mission’, where droplet nuclei (5 mm diameter, which can
travel >1m) are inhaled by susceptible individuals
(Figure 1).5e8 The role of ‘direct contact transmission’ (notDroplets
 diameter, travel ≤1 m
≤ 5 
ng a combination of hand & s
borne, direct contact, and
et’ and ‘droplet nuclei’ areinvolving contaminated surfaces) and ‘indirect contact trans-
mission’ (involving contaminated surfaces) in the spread of
these viruses with pandemic potential has been controversial
(Figure 1).6e8 However, several reviews and models have sug-
gested that indirect contact transmission is the predominant
transmission route for some respiratory viruses, including
influenza, in some settings.7e9
Contaminated surfaces are an established route of trans-
mission for important nosocomial pathogens including Clos-
tridium difficile, meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), Acineto-
bacter baumannii and norovirus, which share the capacity to
survive on surfaces for extended periods.10e12 There is a gen-
eral perception that enveloped viruses, such as influenza and
human coronaviruses including MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV, have a
very limited capacity to survive on dry surfaces.13e15 However,
several studies suggest that SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and influenza
virus have the capacity to survive on dry surfaces for a suffi-
cient duration to facilitate onward transmission.16e18 SARS-CoV
and surrogates, and influenza virus can also survive in envir-
onmental reservoirs such as water, on foods, and in sewage for
extended periods.19e25 Here, we review the studies evaluating
influenza and human coronavirus survival on dry surfaces, fieldSusceptible 
individual
Droplet nuclei
µm diameter, travel >1 m
urface = indirect contact.
indirect contact. (Indirect contact: routes involving a combination
from Atkinson et al.5
investigations that have performed surface sampling for these
viruses, and we consider the importance of contaminated
surfaces in the transmission of these viruses.Search strategy
PubMed searches without date or language restrictions were
performed on November 22nd, 2014 using the following search
terms: [coronavirus or influenza] survival surface OR fomite
transmission OR surface contamination OR disinfection trans-
mission. Studies evaluating contamination of any surface were
included. A total of 254 articles were identified using these
search terms (Appendix A). Articles were also identified by
hand-searching of bibliographies and related articles on
PubMed.Survival on dry surfaces
Tables I and II summarize in-vitro studies evaluating the
capacity of human coronaviruses (including SARS-CoV and
MERS-CoV) and influenza to survive when inoculated on to dry
surfaces. Important methodological differences include varia-
tion in the choice of virus species and strain, method used to
detect virus, deposition mode, titre and volume applied, sur-
face substrate, suspending medium, temperate and relative
humidity (RH), and drying time. These differences mean that
direct comparison of reported survival times between studies is
often not meaningful. In some of the reviewed studies, these
factors have been experimental variables, allowing comment
on the influence of the method used to detect virus, species
and strain, titre, substrate, suspending medium, and temper-
ature/RH on drying time (Tables I and II).
Notwithstanding differences in methodology, some common
themes emerge. Survival times for SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and
surrogates such as transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV)
are generally measured in days, weeks, or months.16,26,28e30,43
Survival times for influenza virus are generally shorter, often
measured in hours rather than days.16,32e34 However, some
studies have reported considerably longer survival times for
influenza virus, measured in days rather than hours.35,36,39e42
This apparent conflict is most likely explained by experi-
mental factors. The difference in survival capacity between
influenza virus and that of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV is best
illustrated by van Doremalen et al. who tested both H1N1
influenza and MERS-CoV.16 Viable MERS-CoV was recovered
after 48 h, with a half-life ranging from w0.5 to 1 h. By
contrast, no viable H1N1 was recovered after 1 h under any of
the conditions tested.
SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV appear to have an unusual capacity
to survive on dry surfaces compared with other human coro-
naviruses (229E, OC43, and NL63).17,28,27,31,44 SARS-CoV, like
the non-enveloped adenovirus comparator, survived for more
than six days when dried on to Petri dishes compared with
human coronavirus HCoV-229E, which survived for less than
72 h.28 Although data are limited, it appears that MERS-CoV
may survive on surfaces for longer than most human corona-
viruses.16 Since other human coronaviruses do not share the
unusual survival properties of SARS-CoV, TGEV and mouse
hepatitis virus (MHV) are often used as surrogates.26,43,45
No study has tested more than one strain of SARS-CoV or
MERS-CoV. However, some studies have tested more than onestrain of influenza, highlighting considerable strain varia-
tion.18,35,39,42 Further work is necessary to evaluate the
importance of strain variation in influenza and coronavirus
survival.
There appears to be a ‘dose response’ in terms of survival,
with more concentrated viral suspensions surviving longer than
less concentrated suspensions.29,33,39 For example, SARS-CoV
survived on disposable gowns for 1 h at 104 TCID50/mL vs 2
days at 106 TCID50/mL.
29 Similarly, H3N2 influenza survived on
bank notes for 1 h at 1.1105 TCID50/mL vs 2 days at
8.9105 TCID50/mL.39
Substantial variation in survival times is evident for coro-
naviruses and influenza on different surface sub-
strates.30,34,37,41 Coronaviruses and influenza both have the
capacity to survive on a wide range of porous and non-porous
materials, including metals, plastics (such as light switches,
telephones, perspex, latex, rubber, and polystyrene), woven
and non-woven fabrics (including cotton, polyester, handker-
chiefs, and disposable tissues), paper (including magazine
pages), wood, glass, stethoscopes, tissue, Formica, bank
notes, tiles, eggs, feathers, and soft toys.16,27,31e34,39,41,43 The
properties of different surfaces are likely to influence survival
times. For example, the survival of influenza dried on to copper
surfaces was considerably shorter than on stainless steel.40
Several studies have evaluated the capacity for SARS-CoV
(and the surrogate TGEV), and influenza virus to survive on
materials widely used as personal protective equipment (PPE)
such as gowns, gloves, and respirators.29,37,43 For example,
TGEV survived on isolation gowns, nitrile and latex gloves, N95
respirators, and scrubs with a<102 reduction for>4 h, and was
detected on some items after 24 h.43 One study showed that
H1N1 influenza virus dried on to various materials could be
transferred to the hands of volunteers for at least 24 h
following inoculation on some surfaces, with clear implications
for the acquisition of viable viruses on the hands of healthcare
personnel during the removal of PPE.42 A more recent study
identified viable pandemic H1N1 influenza after six days on
coupons made from N95 respirators.18
The suspending medium used to dry the viruses on to sur-
faces is another important factor influencing survival
times.18,28,39,46 For example, adding mucus increased the sur-
vival time of influenza dried on bank notes from hours to up to
17 days.39 A related variable is the mode of deposition of the
viruses. Most studies dried a small volume of a known con-
centration of virus in a cell culture medium. However, several
studies have evaluated the use of deposited virus from clinical
specimens, which may be more representative of the clinical
scenario and tends to result in shorter survival times.32,33,39
In all studies that tested varying temperature and RH, lower
temperature and RH favoured the survival of both corona-
viruses and influenza.16e18,26,35,36,38
Different methods have been applied to detect virus emost
often cell culture assays but also RNA detection using poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) or indirect methods such as fluo-
rescence or haemagglutinin assays.27,33,34,37,40 Intact viral RNA
appears to remain detectable on surfaces for longer than viruses
that retain the ability to infect cells.32,33,42 Since PCR assays
only detect a small portion of RNA they cannot be used to
replace culture-based methods in determining viability.
Experimental factors that have been shown to influence
virus viability in vitro are likely to have important implications
for virus survival on hospital surfaces. For example, the titre
Table I
Survival of SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and surrogates on dry surfaces
















2013 USA MERS-CoV 105 Steel and plastic Cell culture
medium only
100 Variable 10 Viable virus detected after 48 h
at 20C/40% RH. Less survival
at 30C/80% RH (8 h) and
30C/30% RH (24 h). Half-life
ranged from w0.5 to 1 h.
Chan et al.17 2011 Hong
Kong




SARS-CoV survived for 5 days with
<10-fold reduction in titre at
room temperature and humidity,
and was viable for >20 days. The
virus was more stable at lower
temperatures (28 vs 38C) and
lower humidity (80e89% vs >95%).
The reduction in viral titre was
similar in suspension compared
with virus dried on surfaces.
Casanova
et al.26






10 20/50 0 TGEV survived with <102
reduction on all items after 4 h








Both TGEV and MHV could
survive in excess of 28 days
under some conditions, with
lower temperature and relative
humidity resulting in improved
survival. TGEV and MHV did not



















Viable virus not detected after
drying; viral RNA detectable for















SARS-CoV, adenovirus and herpes
simplex virus survived >6 days.
HCoV-229E survived for <72 h.
The addition of FCS made little






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s.and volume of virus applied to surfaces will be influenced by
the type and volume of respiratory secretion, as will the sus-
pending medium. The temperature and RH of the hospital
environment is likely to be controlled to comfortable levels,
meaning that some of the extremes of temperature and rela-
tive humidity tested in vitromay not be so relevant in the field.Survival in aerosols
Respiratory virus symptoms such as sneezing and coughing
result in the generation of virus-containing particles, in a size
continuum from 1 to 500 mm.47,48 Whereas the generation of
small droplet nuclei has traditionally been associated with
‘aerosol-generating procedures’, several recent studies have
identified aerosols (droplet nuclei, 5 mm diameter) in the vi-
cinity of patients infected with influenza who are not under-
going recognized aerosol-generating procedures.49e51
Coronaviruses especially have the ability to survive for long
periods in aerosols. For example, HCoV-229E aerosol remained
infectious for six days at 20C and 50% RH.52 One study has
evaluated the survival of MERS-CoV aerosols, finding a 7%
reduction over 10min (at 40% RH).16 By contrast, H1N1 suffered
a 95% reduction over the same time period, suggesting that
influenza virus may be less robust as an aerosol than corona-
viruses. However, other studies have shown extended survival
times for influenza aerosols (surviving up to 36 h).53e55Environmental contamination in field settings
A number of studies have performed environmental sam-
pling for influenza or SARS in field settings (Table III). No studies
have yet been published evaluating MERS-CoV contamination in
field settings.
The major limitation with field studies is the use of PCR to
detect viral RNA, which is best seen as a marker of virus
shedding rather than indicating the presence of viable virus on
surfaces, which must be confirmed by the recovery of viruses
able to infect cells. In a number of influenza virus studies, a
considerably lower rate of detection was identified by viral
culture than by PCR, and in one study no viable virus was
detected by culture despite the detection of influenza virus
RNA.56e58 Similarly, regarding SARS, two studies have detected
environmental reservoirs of SARS-CoV RNA by PCR, but no
viable virus by culture.44,63
Three studies have evaluated influenza contamination of
surfaces in healthcare settings. A UK study detected influenza
virus RNA on two (0.5%) of 397 samples from surfaces around
infected individuals, one of which grew viable influenza.57
More than half of the patients in the study were receiving
antiviral medication, which may have reduced shedding.
Influenza virus RNA was recovered from 38.5% of 13 environ-
mental surfaces around hospitalized patients in Mexico.61 In
one case, one out of five surfaces (a bed rail) was positive from
a patient’s room 72 h after patient discharge and terminal
cleaning. Pappas et al. sampled toys in the waiting room of a
general paediatric practice, finding that only one out of 59 toys
was contaminated with influenza RNA.59 However, a higher
proportion of toys was contaminated with picornavirus RNA
(19.2%), including four out of 15 after cleaning. The identifi-
cation of viral RNA on surfaces after cleaning and disinfection
may be a marker of ineffective cleaning and disinfection.
Table II
Survival of influenza viruses on dry surfaces














2013 USA H1N1 (human
isolate)
105 Steel and plastic Cell culture
medium only
100 Variable 10 No viable virus recovered
after 4 h. No difference
between plastic and steel.
Coulliette
et al.18







100 Variable 60 102 TCID50 per coupon
recovered from time 0
samples (after drying).
Viable virus was
recovered after 6 days
with a 10-fold reduction.
Viral survival was longer

























nylon lower than on
hydrophobic materials.






















n/a n/a Ambient n/a Virus RNA recovered
from three door handles

















20 Ambient 5 Viable virus detected by
tissue culture from some
hard surfaces at higher
applied load for up to
1 h; no viable virus
detectable by tissue
culture after 1 h; virus












10 17e21/23e24 0 (drying
times ranged
from 5
min to 7 h)
Viral RNA detected with
minimal reduction on
most surfaces over 24 h;
viral infectivity falls
away more rapidly, with
infective virus at low
titre detectable from
most surfaces at 4 h but
from only stainless









of virus at 4e24 h on




2011 Paris H1N1 seasonal
and pandemic
strains
105e106 Watch glass Cell culture
medium only
50 Variable 5e17 h Both viruses survived
for >3 days under all
conditions tested;
pandemic H1N1 survived
for >7 days at 35C and
2 months at 4C.
Wood
et al.36





100 4/variable 60 Influenza stable at low
temperature, regardless
of humidity, with 13-day
survival and reduction
by factor of <1 on both
substrates. Surface















500 25.2/55 0 The haemagglutinin titre
of the virus remained
stable on all surfaces
up to 24 h. The virus
remained infective by
TCID50 on all materials
up to 8 h, and on rubber
for up to 24 h.

































Table II (continued )













2010 USA H1N1 (PR8) 104e105 Stainless steel Purchased virus
suspension
50 Variable Until visibly
dry (w30min)
Virus survival assessed




survived for >60min with a








2008 Switzerland H3N2 (2 strains),
H1N1 and
influenza B








Survival varied by strain
from 3 h to 3 days,














Higher inocula survived for

















recovered from 7/14 (50%)
of notes after 24 h, 5/14
(36%) of notes after 48 h,








20 20e24/50e60 Not specified 105 viable virus recovered
from stainless steel after
24 h vs 102 viable virus on
copper after 6 h
Tiwari
et al.41
2006 USA Avian influenza
virus, avian
metapneumovirus








10 Ambient Until visibly dry
(w30e40 min)
Both viruses survive for up to
72 h on most surfaces tested.
Influenza survived for up to






















































































































































































































































































































































Several studies have evaluated influenza RNA or viable
influenza in homes, day-care centres and elementary
schools.58,60,62 The proportion of sites contaminated with
influenza virus RNA varied from 3% to >50% in these studies,
with evidence of seasonal variation in the study by Boone
et al.62 In Bangkok, households randomized to a handwashing
intervention had a lower proportion of sites contaminated with
influenza virus RNA than did control households (11.1% of 45 vs
24.4% of 45).58
Influenza RNA was detected on 15% of the 1862 environ-
mental samples collected from bird markets in Indonesia, and
almost half of the markets (47%) were contaminated at one or
more site(s).56 Viable influenza was cultured from 4.6% of 280
samples tested. Markets that slaughtered birds, as well as one
particular province, were associated with contamination,
whereas zoning of poultry activities and daily disposal of solid
waste were protective.
Two studies have evaluated SARS-CoV contamination. A
study of areas used to care for patients with SARS in Bangkok
and Taipei found that 38.1% of 63 sites were contaminated with
SARS-CoV RNA.44 Furthermore, 6.4% of 31 public areas were
also contaminated with SARS-CoV RNA. A lower rate of
contamination was identified at a Canadian hospital, where
3.5% of 85 surfaces in SARS units were contaminated with SARS-
CoV RNA.63 Viral culture did not detect viable SARS-CoV from
any of the surfaces in these studies. A study of public surfaces
in Jeddah Airport, Saudi Arabia, identified human coronavirus
RNA from three (7.5%) of 40 surface samples. No viral culture
was performed in the study.64Importance of contaminated surfaces in
transmission
Direct and indirect contact transmission is an established
transmission route for several respiratory and gastrointestinal
viruses, including rhinovirus, respiratory syncytial virus, noro-
virus, and rotavirus.7,47,65e67 However, the importance of in-
direct contact transmission (contact transmission involving
contaminated surfaces; Figure 1) in the spread of respiratory
viruses, including influenza, SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV,
compared with other transmission routes is uncertain.6e8,68
For contaminated surfaces to play a role in transmission, a
respiratory pathogen must be shed into the environment, have
the capacity to survive on surfaces, transfer to hands or other
equipment at a concentration above the infectious dose, and
be able to initiate infection through contact with the eyes,
nose or mouth.11
Human coronaviruses and influenza are shed in respiratory
secretions.14,69 They can also survive in the gastrointestinal
tract and have been associated with diarrhoea, which causes
widespread environmental dissemination.14,69e74 In the case of
SARS-CoV, viral loads in nasopharyngeal (up to 106/mL) and
stool (up to 109/g) specimens may be high.69 Titres of influenza
in nasopharyngeal specimens (generally ranging from 105 to
107, but can be up to 1011 copies/mL) and stool specimens (up
to 107/g) exhibit a similar range.57,74e76 Emerging data suggest
that MERS-CoV are shed in approximately equal quantities to
SARS-CoV.77,78 By contrast with the high titre shed from the
respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts, the infectious dose may
be low. For example, the infectious dose for influenza can be
<1 TCID50, and <20 plaque-forming units for SARS-CoV.
13,79
Table III
Field sampling for influenza and human coronaviruses including SARS-CoV environmental contamination






27 sites were sampled at
83 live-bird markets for
avian influenza (H5N1)
Cotton swabs; PCR for
viral RNA and viral
culture
1862 (PCR) 280 (15) 39 (47%) markets contaminated at one
or more site. Structured
questionnaire to assess risk factors for
contamination. One province and
markets that slaughtered birds
associated with contamination;
zoning of poultry activities and daily
disposal of solid waste were
protective.














PCR for viral RNA and
viral culture
397 2 (0.5) Live virus recovered from 1/2 positive
surfaces. 54% of subjects took an
antiviral drug, which may have
influenced shedding. Duration of virus
shedding had a mean of 6.2 days and a
range of 3e10 days.
Simmerman
et al.58






Six household items in 90
households
Moistened rayon tipped
swabs; PCR for viral RNA
and viral culture
540 18 (3.3) 16 (17.8%) of the 90 households had
one or more samples positive for
influenza by PCR. Nine TV remotes, six
toys, two bathroom knobs and one
light switch had positive results. No
viable virus was detected by culture.
Pappas
et al.59
2010 Toys in the waiting room
of a general paediatric
practice in Virginia, USA
Hard surfaces and fabric




RSV and influenza by PCR









sampled in the morning,
at midday and in the
afternoon.
Moistened swabs; PCR for
viral RNA
54 13 (24.1) Also, norovirus RNA was found on
16.4% of 55 surfaces sampled.
Macias
et al.61
2009 Hospital in Mexico City,
Mexico
Samples collected from
hands and surfaces in the
rooms of patients with
confirmed influenza
Swabs; PCR for viral RNA 13 5 (38.5) In one case, 1/5 surfaces (a bed rail)
was positive from a patient’s room
72 h after patient discharge and
terminal cleaning. 5/6 samples from









Moistened swabs; PCR for
viral RNA
92 35 (38.0) None of 33 surfaces sampled during
summer months vs 59% of 59 samples
during March.
Samples from 14 day-
care centres
218 e Influenza was detected on 23% of
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and influenza virus can survive on dry
surfaces for extended periods, particularly when suspended in
human secretions (Tables I and II), and may contaminate hand-
touch sites in the field (Table III).
Viral and bacterial surface contamination can be trans-
ferred to hands, and serial transfer to a number of surfaces
from contaminated hands may occur.11,42,80e85 For example,
Bean et al. calculated that an infectious dose of virus could be
transmitted for at least 2 h and possibly up to 8 h from stainless
steel surfaces to hands.42
In order for the virus to initiate indirect contact trans-
mission, oral inoculation or contact with mucous membranes
must occur to transfer sufficient viruses. Nasal inoculation is a
frequent route for establishing influenza and SARS
infection.86e90 Whereas oral inoculation has not been reported
for SARS, it may occur for influenza and other viruses.13,91,92
Thus, the steps necessary to facilitate indirect contact
transmission of both SARS-CoV and influenza are established.
Although data are more limited for MERS-CoV, it appears to
have the key properties to facilitate indirect contact
transmission.
Determining which route is most important is challenging,
but it seems that direct contact, indirect contact, droplet and
airborne transmission do occur with both SARS-CoV and influ-
enza viruses on occasion.8,68 Few data are available evaluating
transmission routes for coronaviruses, but the relative impor-
tance of the various routes for influenza virus has been evalu-
ated through mathematical models, animal models, and
intervention studies.9,93,94
Several mathematical models have been applied to SARS
transmission, but none has considered an environmental
route.93,95 However, some influenza transmission models have
evaluated the relative importance of airborne, droplet, and
contact influenza transmission.9,96,97 Two of these models
conclude that contact transmission of influenza is at least as
important as airborne or droplet spread, whereas one study
found that contact transmission was negligible compared with
other routes.9,96,97 However, it is important to note that the
relative contribution of contact, droplet, and airborne trans-
mission depends on a combination of viral factors (e.g. ca-
pacity to survive on surfaces), host factors (e.g. frequency of
hand contact with the nose) and environmental factors (e.g.
size of enclosure and density of shedders). Varying these and
other parameters will change the relative contribution of the
various transmission routes.9
Several influenza transmission models have compared the
importance of indirect contact transmission (involving surface
contamination) with direct contact transmission (that occurs
independently of surface contamination).98,99 One model in-
dicates that indirect transmission via contaminated surfaces
generates touch frequency-dependent patterns whereas
transmission via the air generates human density-dependent
patterns.98 Another model compared the involvement of
droplet-contaminated versus hand-contaminated surfaces.99
Droplet-contaminated surfaces were more likely to be
involved in transmission than hand-contaminated surfaces
(w10-fold difference), and large surfaces (such as table tops)
had a higher transmission potential than small surfaces (such as
door handles). A number of simplifying assumptions were
made, which may be unsounde for example, that people touch
portions of the fomite homogeneously, and that pathogens on
fomites are homogeneously distributed. Also, transportation of
Table IV
Calculating the time that an infectious aerosol shed by a patient
infected with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus could
survive






The calculation assumes an infectious dose equal to severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (<20 plaque-forming units) and a
decay rate of 7% over 10min in a room with no air changes.13,16 The
calculation used the following equation: P(t) ¼ P0e  rt, where
P(t) ¼ the amount of some quantity at time t, P0 ¼ initial amount at
time t ¼ 0, r ¼ the decay rate, t ¼ time (number of periods).contamination from one type of fomite to another via human
hands was not modelled. Notwithstanding these limitations,
the study provides some useful data on indirect contact
transmission of influenza.
An alternative approach is the use of animal models. For
example, a guinea-pig model evaluated the relative contribu-
tion of airborne, droplet, and indirect contact transmission.94
Indirect contact transmission was evaluated by placing unin-
fected animals in cages vacated by experimentally infected
animals without changing bedding, food dishes, and water
bottles. Animals were exposed to these cages for 24 h and
tested for infection using nasal washings. Around a quarter of
exposed guinea-pigs became infected, which was less efficient
than transmission through airborne and droplet experiments
(25e100% efficiency). Experimental contamination of surfaces
in the cages was unable to establish infection. Another guinea-
pig model showed that increasing the temperature to 30C
blocked aerosol but not contact transmission of influenza.100
This provides further evidence that the relative importance
of the various transmission routes is context dependent.
A small number of studies have demonstrated that in-
terventions in field settings to improve surface or hand hygiene
reduce influenza transmission, demonstrating the importance
of contact transmission.63,101,102 For example, introducing
regular cleaning using disinfectant wipes reduced the rate of
respiratory and diarrhoeal disease in elementary schools.60Implications for cleaning and disinfection, and
infection prevention and control in healthcare
settings
The likely contribution of droplet, direct and indirect con-
tact, and to a lesser extent the airborne route in the trans-
mission of influenza, SARS and MERS dictates that each route
must be separately addressed by infection prevention and
control interventions. The use of a surgical mask will protect
the respiratory tract from droplets, an N95 (FFP3) respirator
will protect the respiratory tract from droplet nuclei, and
gloves, gowns and eye protection will prevent contact with
mucous membranes and contamination of clothing or hands for
subsequent nasal inoculation.103 Emerging literature suggests
that doffing PPE presents a challenging risk for the acquisition
of important viruses on hands.104,105 Thus, protocols should be
in place for minimizing the risk of contamination of hands and
clothing, and hand hygiene should be performed following
removal of PPE.
The extended survival of influenza virus, SARS-CoV and
MERS-CoV on surfaces (Tables I and II) and some evidence of
contamination in field settings (Table III) argue for enhanced
disinfection, particularly at the time of patient discharge.59,61
A range of hospital disinfectants are active against SARS-CoV
and surrogates, and influenza, including alcohol, hypo-
chlorites (bleach), quaternary ammonium compounds, and
hydrogen peroxide, although inactivation is time and concen-
tration dependent and will be influenced by other factors such
as type of contaminated surface, specific product, and protein
load.28,45,106,107 However, in-vitro disinfectant effectiveness is
a poor predictor for the elimination of contamination from
surfaces if cleaning/disinfection is inadequate, which is often
the case in hospitals.108,109 Thus, there may be a role for
automated room disinfection (ARD) systems, such as hydrogenperoxide vapour and ultraviolet (UV) light, when patients
known to be infected with pandemic influenza or coronaviruses
are discharged.45,108
There may be the potential for extended survival of an in-
fectious viral aerosol in patients’ rooms following their
discharge. Using MERS-CoV as an illustrative example, infec-
tious aerosol above the infectious dose could be present after
the discharge of the patient for up to 26 h, assuming no air
changes in the room and depending on the shed titre (Table IV).
ARD systems address both contaminated air and surfaces,
which may be important if infectious aerosol above the infec-
tious dose remains following patient discharge.
Another consideration is the requirement for large quanti-
ties of N95 (FFP3) respirators in the event of a pandemic of
influenza or MERS/SARS. Stockpiles of N95 respirators required
for a pandemic are large, and stock shortages were acknowl-
edged during the 2009 N1H1 influenza pandemic.110 Both
influenza virus and SARS-CoV surrogates have been shown to
survive for extended periods on N95 respirator material.18,37,43
This survival represents a barrier to the reuse of N95 respira-
tors. One approach is to disinfect the N95 respirators. Several
candidate technologies have been evaluated for the disinfec-
tion of N95 respirators; UV light, hydrogen peroxide vapour,
and ethylene oxide show most promise.111Conclusion
We reviewed the capacity of viruses with pandemic poten-
tial, influenza SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, to survive on dry sur-
faces. The experimental methods used to test survival are
important, but it seems that surface survival of SARS/MERS-CoV
is greater than that of influenza virus. Important factors that
influence the survival of these viruses on surfaces include:
strain variations, a ‘doseeresponse’ relationship between the
titre applied and survival time, the surface substrate (including
the ability to survive on materials used to make PPE), the
suspending medium (with the addition of mucus increasing
substantially the survival time of influenza), the mode of
deposition, temperature and RH, and the method used to
determine the presence of the virus (specifically culture versus
the use of PCR to detect viral RNA). All three viruses are able to
survive in an aerosol for a considerable length of time (>24 h),
which may have important infection control implications.
Environmental sampling has been performed for influenza
virus and human coronaviruses (including SARS-CoV) in a
number of field settings. Most studies have used PCR to detect
viral RNA, which may not necessarily represent the presence of
viable virus, but should be seen as a marker of virus shedding.
Some studies have demonstrated the presence of viable influ-
enza virus on surfaces using cell culture. There is a wide range
in terms of the frequency of sites contaminated with influenza
virus or SARS-CoV RNA, ranging from <5% to >50%, including
hand-touch sites.
The importance of indirect contact transmission is uncertain
compared with other transmission routes, principally direct
contact transmission, droplet, and airborne routes. Influenza
virus, SARS-CoV and probably MERS-CoV are shed into the
environment at concentrations far in excess of the infective
dose, they can survive for extended periods on surfaces, and
sampling has identified contamination of hospital surfaces.
Contaminated surfaces could result in onward contamination of
hands or equipment, which could then initiate inoculation
through contact with the nose, eyes, or mouth. Thus, the steps
required for indirect contact transmission are established.
Mathematical modelling, animalmodels, and intervention trials
suggest that contact transmission may be the most important
route for influenza, but that this is context dependent.
The infection prevention and control implications of these
findings include the need to wear appropriate PPE to account
for contact, droplet and airborne routes, paying particular
attention to the risk of contamination of hands and clothing
during PPE removal. The potential for inadequate distribution
and contact time during manual cleaning and disinfection,
combined with the risk of extended survival of infectious
aerosol, may argue for the use of ARD systems. These systems
may also have a role in disinfection and reuse of N95/FFP3
respirators.
Viruses with pandemic potential including influenza, MERS-
CoV, and SARS-CoV can survive for extended periods on dry
surfaces, cause contamination in field settings and may require
enhanced cleaning and disinfection to assure effective infec-
tion prevention and control.
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coronavirus survival surfaces (June 11th, 2013: 9 studies)
influenza survival surfaces (June 11th, 2013: 29 studies)
coronavirus fomite transmission (June 20th, 2013: 8 studies)
influenza virus fomite transmission (June 20th, 2013: 43
studies)
coronavirus surface contamination (June 20th, 2013: 4 studies)
influenza virus surface contamination (June 20th, 2013: 14
studies)
disinfection influenza transmission (June 04th, 2014: 112
studies)
disinfection SARS transmission (June 04th, 2014: 35 studies)
Updated May 21st, 2014References
1. de Groot RJ, Baker SC, Baric RS, et al. Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV); Announcement of the Coro-
navirus Study Group. J Virol 2013;87:7790e7792.
2. Zaki AM, van Boheemen S, Bestebroer TM, Osterhaus AD,
Fouchier RA. Isolation of a novel coronavirus from a man with
pneumonia in Saudi Arabia. N Engl J Med 2012;367:1814e1820.
3. Fineberg HV. Pandemic preparedness and response e lessons
from the H1N1 influenza of 2009. N Engl J Med
2014;370:1335e1342.
4. Hayden FG. Respiratory viral threats. Curr Opin Infect Dis
2006;19:169e178.
5. World Health Organization. Annex C: Respiratory droplets. In:
Atkinson J, Chartier Y, Pessoa-Silva CL, et al., editors. Natural
ventilation for infection control in health-care settings. Geneva:
WHO; 2009.
6. Bridges CB, Kuehnert MJ, Hall CB. Transmission of influenza:
implications for control in health care settings. Clin Infect Dis
2003;37:1094e1101.
7. Boone SA, Gerba CP. Significance of fomites in the spread of
respiratory and enteric viral disease. Appl Environ Microbiol
2007;73:1687e1696.
8. Brankston G, Gitterman L, Hirji Z, Lemieux C, Gardam M.
Transmission of influenza A in human beings. Lancet Infect Dis
2007;7:257e265.
9. Spicknall IH, Koopman JS, Nicas M, Pujol JM, Li S, Eisenberg JN.
Informing optimal environmental influenza interventions: how
the host, agent, and environment alter dominant routes of
transmission. PLoS Comput Biol 2010;6:e1000969.
10. Otter JA, Yezli S, Salkeld JA, French GL. Evidence that contam-
inated surfaces contribute to the transmission of hospital path-
ogens and an overview of strategies to address contaminated
surfaces in hospital settings. Am J Infect Control
2013;41:S6eS11.
11. Otter JA, Yezli S, French GL. The role played by contaminated
surfaces in the transmission of nosocomial pathogens. Infect
Control Hosp Epidemiol 2011;32:687e699.
12. Weber DJ, Rutala WA, Miller MB, Huslage K, Sickbert-Bennett E.
Role of hospital surfaces in the transmission of emerging health
care-associated pathogens: norovirus, Clostridium difficile,
and Acinetobacter species. Am J Infect Control
2010;38:S25eS33.
13. Yezli S, Otter JA. Minimum infective dose of the major human
respiratory and enteric viruses transmitted through food and the
environment. Food Environ Microbiol 2011;3:1e30.
14. Geller C, Varbanov M, Duval RE. Human coronaviruses: insights
into environmental resistance and its influence on the devel-
opment of new antiseptic strategies. Viruses 2012;4:
3044e3068.
15. Kramer A, Schwebke I, Kampf G. How long do nosocomial path-
ogens persist on inanimate surfaces? A systematic review. BMC
Infect Dis 2006;6:130.
16. van Doremalen N, Bushmaker T, Munster VJ. Stability of Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) under
different environmental conditions. Euro Surveill 2013;18. pii:
20590.
17. Chan KH, Peiris JS, Lam SY, Poon LL, Yuen KY, Seto WH. The
effects of temperature and relative humidity on the viability of
the SARS Coronavirus. Adv Virol 2011;734690.
18. Coulliette AD, Perry KA, Edwards JR, Noble-Wang JA. Persistence
of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus on N95 respirators.
Appl Environ Microbiol 2013;79:2148e2155.
19. Casanova L, Rutala WA, Weber DJ, Sobsey MD. Survival of sur-
rogate coronaviruses in water. Water Res 2009;43:1893e1898.
20. Mullis L, Saif LJ, Zhang Y, Zhang X, Azevedo MS. Stability of
bovine coronavirus on lettuce surfaces under household refrig-
eration conditions. Food Microbiol 2012;30:180e186.
21. Yepiz-Gomez MS, Gerba CP, Bright KR. Survival of respiratory
viruses on fresh produce. Food Environ Virol 2013. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12560-013-9114-4.
22. Wang XW, Li J, Guo T, et al. Concentration and detection of SARS
coronavirus in sewage from Xiao Tang Shan Hospital and the
309th Hospital of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Water
Sci Technol 2005;52:213e221.
23. Shigematsu S, Dublineau A, Sawoo O, et al. Influenza A virus
survival in water is influenced by the origin species of the host
cell. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2014;8:123e130.
24. Chmielewski R, Swayne DE. Avian influenza: public health and
food safety concerns. Annu Rev Food Sci Technol
2011;2:37e57.
25. Nazir J, Haumacher R, Ike A, Stumpf P, Bohm R, Marschang RE.
Long-term study on tenacity of avian influenza viruses in water
(distilled water, normal saline, and surface water) at different
temperatures. Avian Dis 2010;54:720e724.
26. Casanova LM, Jeon S, Rutala WA, Weber DJ, Sobsey MD. Effects of
air temperature and relative humidity on coronavirus survival on
surfaces. Appl Environ Microbiol 2010;76:2712e2717.
27. Muller A, Tillmann RL, Muller A, Simon A, Schildgen O. Stability of
human metapneumovirus and human coronavirus NL63 on medi-
cal instruments and in the patient environment. J Hosp Infect
2008;69:406e408.
28. Rabenau HF, Cinatl J, Morgenstern B, Bauer G, Preiser W,
Doerr HW. Stability and inactivation of SARS coronavirus. Med
Microbiol Immunol 2005;194:1e6.
29. Lai MY, Cheng PK, Lim WW. Survival of severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus. Clin Infect Dis 2005;41:e67e71.
30. Duan SM, Zhao XS, Wen RF, et al. Stability of SARS coronavirus
in human specimens and environment and its sensitivity
to heating and UV irradiation. Biomed Environ Sci
2003;16:246e255.
31. Sizun J, Yu MW, Talbot PJ. Survival of human coronaviruses 229E
and OC43 in suspension and after drying on surfaces: a possible
source of hospital-acquired infections. J Hosp Infect
2000;46:55e60.
32. Zuo Z, de Abin M, Chander Y, Kuehn TH, Goyal SM, Pui DY.
Comparison of spike and aerosol challenge tests for the recovery
of viable influenza virus from non-woven fabrics. Influenza Other
Respi Viruses 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irv.12095.
33. Mukherjee DV, Cohen B, Bovino ME, Desai S, Whittier S,
Larson EL. Survival of influenza virus on hands and fomites in
community and laboratory settings. Am J Infect Control
2012;40:590e594.
34. Greatorex JS, Digard P, Curran MD, et al. Survival of influenza A
(H1N1) on materials found in households: implications for infec-
tion control. PLoS One 2011;6:e27932.
35. Dublineau A, Batejat C, Pinon A, Burguiere AM, Leclercq I,
Manuguerra JC. Persistence of the 2009 pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) virus in water and on non-porous surface. PLoS One
2011;6:e28043.
36. Wood JP, Choi YW, Chappie DJ, Rogers JV, Kaye JZ. Environ-
mental persistence of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1)
virus. Environ Sci Technol 2010;44:7515e7520.
37. Sakaguchi H, Wada K, Kajioka J, et al. Maintenance of influenza
virus infectivity on the surfaces of personal protective equipment
and clothing used in healthcare settings. Environ Health Prev
Med 2010;15:344e349.
38. McDevitt J, Rudnick S, First M, Spengler J. Role of absolute hu-
midity in the inactivation of influenza viruses on stainless steel
surfaces at elevated temperatures. Appl Environ Microbiol
2010;76:3943e3947.
39. Thomas Y, Vogel G, Wunderli W, et al. Survival of influenza virus
on banknotes. Appl Environ Microbiol 2008;74:3002e3007.
40. Noyce JO, Michels H, Keevil CW. Inactivation of influenza A virus
on copper versus stainless steel surfaces. Appl Environ Microbiol
2007;73:2748e2750.41. Tiwari A, Patnayak DP, Chander Y, Parsad M, Goyal SM. Survival
of two avian respiratory viruses on porous and nonporous sur-
faces. Avian Dis 2006;50:284e287.
42. Bean B, Moore BM, Sterner B, Peterson LR, Gerding DN,
Balfour Jr HH. Survival of influenza viruses on environmental
surfaces. J Infect Dis 1982;146:47e51.
43. Casanova L, Rutala WA, Weber DJ, Sobsey MD. Coronavirus sur-
vival on healthcare personal protective equipment. Infect Con-
trol Hosp Epidemiol 2010;31:560e561.
44. Dowell SF, Simmerman JM, Erdman DD, et al. Severe acute res-
piratory syndrome coronavirus on hospital surfaces. Clin Infect
Dis 2004;39:652e657.
45. Goyal SM, Chander Y, Yezli S, Otter JA. Evaluating the virucidal
efficacy of hydrogen peroxide vapour. J Hosp Infect
2014;86:255e259.
46. Parker ER, Dunham WB, MacNeal WJ. Resistance of the Mel-
bourne strain of influenza virus to desiccation. J Lab Clin Med
1944;29:37e42.
47. Musher DM. How contagious are common respiratory tract in-
fections? N Engl J Med 2003;348:1256e1266.
48. Gerone PJ, Couch RB, Keefer GV, Douglas RG, Derrenbacher EB,
Knight V. Assessment of experimental and natural viral aerosols.
Bacteriol Rev 1966;30:576e588.
49. Tran K, Cimon K, Severn M, Pessoa-Silva CL, Conly J. Aerosol
generating procedures and risk of transmission of acute respira-
tory infections to healthcare workers: a systematic review. PLoS
One 2012;7:e35797.
50. Bischoff WE, Swett K, Leng I, Peters TR. Exposure to influenza
virus aerosols during routine patient care. J Infect Dis
2013;207:1037e1046.
51. Thompson KA, Pappachan JV, Bennett AM, et al. Influenza
aerosols in UK hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) pandemic e the
risk of aerosol generation during medical procedures. PLoS One
2013;8:e56278.
52. Ijaz MK, Brunner AH, Sattar SA, Nair RC, Johnson-Lussenburg CM.
Survival characteristics of airborne human coronavirus 229E.
J Gen Virol 1985;66(Pt 12):2743e2748.
53. Schaffer FL, Soergel ME, Straube DC. Survival of airborne influ-
enza virus: effects of propagating host, relative humidity, and
composition of spray fluids. Arch Virol 1976;51:263e273.
54. Mitchell CA, Guerin LF. Influenza A of human, swine, equine and
avian origin: comparison of survival in aerosol form. Can J Comp
Med 1972;36:9e11.
55. Tellier R. Review of aerosol transmission of influenza A virus.
Emerg Infect Dis 2006;12:1657e1662.
56. Indriani R, Samaan G, Gultom A, et al. Environmental sampling
for avian influenza virus A (H5N1) in live-bird markets, Indonesia.
Emerg Infect Dis 2010;16:1889e1895.
57. Killingley B, Greatorex J, Cauchemez S, et al. Virus shedding and
environmental deposition of novel A (H1N1) pandemic influenza
virus: interim findings. Health Technol Assess 2010;14:237e354.
58. Simmerman JM, Suntarattiwong P, Levy J, et al. Influenza virus
contamination of common household surfaces during the 2009
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in Bangkok, Thailand: implications
for contact transmission. Clin Infect Dis 2010;51:1053e1061.
59. Pappas DE, Hendley JO, Schwartz RH. Respiratory viral RNA on
toys in pediatric office waiting rooms. Pediatr Infect Dis J
2010;29:102e104.
60. Bright KR, Boone SA, Gerba CP. Occurrence of bacteria and vi-
ruses on elementary classroom surfaces and the potential role of
classroom hygiene in the spread of infectious diseases. J Sch Nurs
2010;26:33e41.
61. Macias AE, de la Torre A, Moreno-Espinosa S, Leal PE, Bourlon MT,
Ruiz-Palacios GM. Controlling the novel A (H1N1) influenza virus:
don’t touch your face! J Hosp Infect 2009;73:280e281.
62. Boone SA, Gerba CP. The occurrence of influenza A virus on
household and day care center fomites. J Infect
2005;51:103e109.
63. Booth TF, Kournikakis B, Bastien N, et al. Detection of airborne
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus and en-
vironmental contamination in SARS outbreak units. J Infect Dis
2005;191:1472e1477.
64. Memish ZA, Almasri M, Assirri A, et al. Environmental sampling for
respiratory pathogens in Jeddah airport during the 2013 Hajj
season. Am J Infect Control 2014;42:1266e1269.
65. Gwaltney Jr JM, Hendley JO. Transmission of experimental
rhinovirus infection by contaminated surfaces. Am J Epidemiol
1982;116:828e833.
66. Abad FX, Pinto RM, Bosch A. Survival of enteric viruses on envir-
onmental fomites. Appl Environ Microbiol 1994;60:3704e3710.
67. Hall CB. Respiratory syncytial virus: its transmission in the hos-
pital environment. Yale J Biol Med 1982;55:219e223.
68. Chan PK, Tang JW, Hui DS. SARS: clinical presentation, trans-
mission, pathogenesis and treatment options. Clin Sci (Lond)
2006;110:193e204.
69. Hung IF, Cheng VC, Wu AK, et al. Viral loads in clinical specimens
and SARS manifestations. Emerg Infect Dis 2004;10:1550e1557.
70. Zhang XM, Herbst W, Kousoulas KG, Storz J. Biological and gen-
etic characterization of a hemagglutinating coronavirus isolated
from a diarrhoeic child. J Med Virol 1994;44:152e161.
71. Vabret A, Dina J, Gouarin S, Petitjean J, Corbet S, Freymuth F.
Detection of the new human coronavirus HKU1: a report of 6
cases. Clin Infect Dis 2006;42:634e639.
72. Peiris JS, Chu CM, Cheng VC, et al. Clinical progression and viral
load in a community outbreak of coronavirus-associated SARS
pneumonia: a prospective study. Lancet 2003;361:1767e1772.
73. Pinsky BA, Mix S, Rowe J, Ikemoto S, Baron EJ. Long-term shed-
ding of influenza A virus in stool of immunocompromised child.
Emerg Infect Dis 2010;16:1165e1167.
74. Chan MC, Lee N, Chan PK, Leung TF, Sung JJ. Fecal detection of
influenza A virus in patients with concurrent respiratory and
gastrointestinal symptoms. J Clin Virol 2009;45:208e211.
75. Kaiser L, Fritz RS, Straus SE, Gubareva L, Hayden FG. Symptom
pathogenesis during acute influenza: interleukin-6 and other
cytokine responses. J Med Virol 2001;64:262e268.
76. Hall CB, Douglas Jr RG, Geiman JM, Meagher MP. Viral shedding
patterns of children with influenza B infection. J Infect Dis
1979;140:610e613.
77. Drosten C, Seilmaier M, Corman VM, et al. Clinical features
and virological analysis of a case of Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus infection. Lancet Infect Dis
2013;13:745e751.
78. Guery B, Poissy J, el Mansouf L, et al. Clinical features and viral
diagnosis of two cases of infection with Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome coronavirus: a report of nosocomial transmission.
Lancet 2013;381:2265e2272.
79. Watanabe T, Bartrand TA, Weir MH, Omura T, Haas CN. Devel-
opment of a doseeresponse model for SARS coronavirus. Risk
Anal 2010;30:1129e1138.
80. Oelberg DG, Joyner SE, Jiang X, Laborde D, Islam MP,
Pickering LK. Detection of pathogen transmission in neonatal
nurseries using DNA markers as surrogate indicators. Pediatrics
2000;105:311e315.
81. Barker J, Vipond IB, Bloomfield SF. Effects of cleaning and
disinfection in reducing the spread of Norovirus contamination
via environmental surfaces. J Hosp Infect 2004;58:42e49.
82. Guerrero DM, Nerandzic MM, Jury LA, Jinno S, Chang S,
Donskey CJ. Acquisition of spores on gloved hands after contact
with the skin of patients with Clostridium difficile infection and
with environmental surfaces in their rooms. Am J Infect Control
2012;40:556e558.
83. Rusin P, Maxwell S, Gerba C. Comparative surface-to-hand and
fingertip-to-mouth transfer efficiency of gram-positive bacteria,
gram-negative bacteria, and phage. J Appl Microbiol
2002;93:585e592.84. Jiang X, Dai X, Goldblatt S, et al. Pathogen transmission in child
care settings studied by using a cauliflower virus DNA as a sur-
rogate marker. J Infect Dis 1998;177:881e888.
85. Rheinbaben F, Schunemann S, Gross T, Wolff MH. Transmission of
viruses via contact in a household setting: experiments using
bacteriophage straight phiX174 as a model virus. J Hosp Infect
2000;46:61e66.
86. Nagata N, Iwata N, Hasegawa H, et al. Pathology and virus
dispersion in cynomolgus monkeys experimentally infected with
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus via different
inoculation routes. Int J Exp Pathol 2007;88:403e414.
87. McAuliffe J, Vogel L, Roberts A, et al. Replication of SARS coro-
navirus administered into the respiratory tract of African Green,
rhesus and cynomolgus monkeys. Virology 2004;330:8e15.
88. Henle W, Henle G, Stokes J, Maris EP. Experimental exposure of
human subjects to viruses of influenza. J Immunol
1946;52:145e165.
89. Frankova V. Inhalatory infection of mice with influenza A0/PR8
virus. I. The site of primary virus replication and its spread in the
respiratory tract. Acta Virol 1975;19:29e34.
90. Qin C, Wang J, Wei Q, et al. An animal model of SARS produced by
infection of Macaca mulatta with SARS coronavirus. J Pathol
2005;206:251e259.
91. Quan FS, Compans RW, Kang SM. Oral vaccination with inacti-
vated influenza vaccine induces cross-protective immunity.
Vaccine 2012;30:180e188.
92. VanDalen KK, Franklin AB, Mooers NL, Sullivan HJ, Shriner SA.
Shedding light on avian influenza H4N6 infection in mallards:
modes of transmission and implications for surveillance. PLoS
One 2010;5:e12851.
93. van Kleef E, Robotham JV, Jit M, Deeny SR, Edmunds WJ.
Modelling the transmission of healthcare associated infections: a
systematic review. BMC Infect Dis 2013;13:294.
94. Mubareka S, Lowen AC, Steel J, Coates AL, Garcia-Sastre A,
Palese P. Transmission of influenza virus via aerosols and fomites
in the guinea pig model. J Infect Dis 2009;199:858e865.
95. Kwok KO, Leung GM, Lam WY, Riley S. Using models to identify
routes of nosocomial infection: a large hospital outbreak of SARS
in Hong Kong. Proc Biol Sci 2007;274:611e617.
96. Atkinson MP, Wein LM. Quantifying the routes of transmission for
pandemic influenza. Bull Math Biol 2008;70:820e867.
97. Nicas M, Jones RM. Relative contributions of four exposure
pathways to influenza infection risk. Risk Anal
2009;29:1292e1303.
98. Li S, Eisenberg JN, Spicknall IH, Koopman JS. Dynamics and
control of infections transmitted from person to person through
the environment. Am J Epidemiol 2009;170:257e265.
99. Zhao J, Eisenberg JE, Spicknall IH, Li S, Koopman JS. Model
analysis of fomite mediated influenza transmission. PLoS One
2012;7:e51984.
100. Lowen AC, Steel J, Mubareka S, Palese P. High temperature (30
degrees C) blocks aerosol but not contact transmission of influ-
enza virus. J Virol 2008;82:5650e5652.
101. Cowling BJ, Chan KH, Fang VJ, et al. Facemasks and hand hy-
giene to prevent influenza transmission in households: a cluster
randomized trial. Ann Intern Med 2009;151:437e446.
102. Apisarnthanarak A, Apisarnthanarak P, Cheevakumjorn B,
Mundy LM. Intervention with an infection control bundle to
reduce transmission of influenza-like illnesses in a Thai pre-
school. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2009;30:817e822.
103. Seto WH, Tsang D, Yung RW, et al. Effectiveness of precautions
against droplets and contact in prevention of nosocomial trans-
mission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Lancet
2003;361:1519e1520.
104. Beam EL, Gibbs SG, Boulter KC, Beckerdite ME, Smith PW.
A method for evaluating health care workers’ personal protective
equipment technique. Am J Infect Control 2011;39:415e420.
105. Johnson DW, Sullivan JN, Piquette CA, et al. Lessons learned:
critical care management of patients with Ebola in the United
States. Crit Care Med 2015;43:1157e1164.
106. Hulkower RL, Casanova LM, Rutala WA, Weber DJ, Sobsey MD.
Inactivation of surrogate coronaviruses on hard surfaces by
health care germicides. Am J Infect Control 2011;39:401e407.
107. Jeong EK, Bae JE, Kim IS. Inactivation of influenza A virus H1N1
by disinfection process. Am J Infect Control 2010;38:354e360.
108. Otter JA, Yezli S, Perl TM, Barbut F, French GL. Is there a role for
“no-touch” automated room disinfection systems in infection
prevention and control? J Hosp Infect 2013;83:1e13.109. Carling PC, Parry MM, Rupp ME, Po JL, Dick B, Von Beheren S.
Improving cleaning of the environment surrounding patients in 36
acute care hospitals. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
2008;29:1035e1041.
110. Anonymous. Interim guidance on infection control measures for
2009 H1N1 influenza in healthcare settings, including protection
of healthcare personnel. Miss RN 2009;71:13e18.
111. Viscusi DJ, Bergman MS, Eimer BC, Shaffer RE. Evaluation of five
decontamination methods for filtering facepiece respirators. Ann
Occup Hyg 2009;53:815e827.
